Imposing viewpoint diversity is the wrong cure for academia’s ills

The US federal government has for some time been pressuring universities to increase the “viewpoint diversity” of faculty, and much the same is true of some state governments in the US. Arguments for “intellectual diversity” have also been put forward in the UK, for instance by Matt Goodwin in his book Bad Education and by the University of Buckingham’s Heterodox Academy.

What is often demanded is that a wide range of political views are represented within each subject department, and specifically that right-wing academics must be recruited to correct an imbalance. This builds on longstanding complaints that the humanities and social sciences are dominated by “liberals”, “progressives” or “socialists” and that, as a result, research is biased and students are being indoctrinated.

The principle of viewpoint diversity appears to be modelled on the very policies designed to increase gender, ethnic and racial diversity that are rejected by the right. Indeed, there is a parallel with claims by postcolonial and decolonial theorists about epistemic injustice: that ideas, beliefs and knowledge from outside the West are not given adequate representation within the Western academy, despite its claim to offer what is universally true and valuable.

A variety of grounds have been put forward for enforcing viewpoint diversity. One is that it is essential for the pursuit and dissemination of academic knowledge. A quite different justification is that no cogent determination of the truth of conflicting views is possible, so that they all deserve equal representation. Yet another is that encouraging diverse views will result in “the survival of the fittest” in the “academic marketplace”.

Generally speaking, those on the right argue that intellectual diversity is required for the pursuit of truth, although it should be said that the US president has a loose relationship with facts. Here, I will take it for granted that gaining academic knowledge is possible, desirable and important. But, while intellectual diversity in the political views of academics can be helpful for this, it is neither necessary nor sufficient.

Calls for intellectual diversity are sometimes linked with the more practical idea that genuine dialogue across political and other divides should be encouraged. This is certainly needed, and it also points towards what is an indispensable requirement for academic research and teaching: discussion devoted to producing factual knowledge and conceptual understanding rather than to advancing particular viewpoints.

Furthermore, there must be a willingness to consider a wide range of ideas, to suspend existing beliefs if this seems necessary for the task of enquiry, and to reject them when they conflict with cogent counter-argument. Advocates of intellectual diversity are correct that for some academics in the humanities and social sciences pursuit of the goal of producing knowledge and understanding is distorted by commitment to political critique and activism.

Also frequently linked with championing viewpoint diversity is vigorous support for academic freedom and free speech. However, while these are required, they are subject to restrictions. Academic freedom allows publication, via teaching or research, of what is taken to be established knowledge in the relevant field, and the expression of individual views about the validity and implications of this. However, it does not warrant academics expressing opinions outside of their fields, whatever their politics.

This can only be justified under free speech provision, which, of course, is not restricted to academics. Moreover, it, too, involves limits, notably concerning incitement to violence. Nor does it require that others take no action against a person expressing views with which they disagree, only that any response be legal. Within the academy, toleration does not rule out robust criticism of what colleagues or students say, even if this is found upsetting or distressing – provided it does not descend into personal abuse, harassment or suppression. However, whatever some on the right might insist, “the exchange of opinions” is not the main academic function.

A further complication is that not all positions ought to be tolerated, even within academia: those for which there is currently little supporting evidence, or against which there is cogent counter-evidence, should be excluded. There is, to take extreme examples, no justification for tolerating denials that millions of Jews were killed in extermination camps under the Nazis or assertions that the world was created only 6,000 years ago – let alone any obligation to hire academics who make such claims. At the same time, there must not be exclusion of views simply because they are found politically offensive, immoral or distressing, whether by a majority or a minority.

Unjustifiable intolerance certainly operates within some academic fields. Yet, where this occurs, the main problem is not intellectual uniformity but lack of sufficient commitment to objective assessment of ideas and evidence. This stems from the influence of self-undermining relativistic and sceptical arguments and from the increasing prevalence of activist conceptions of academic work which demand that it be designed to have practical “impact”. Increasing intellectual diversity is no remedy for this. Indeed, it will worsen the problem because it places primary emphasis on background beliefs rather than on commitment to the academic task.

Whether coming from the right or the left, attempts to impose viewpoint diversity, far from enhancing the pursuit of academic enquiry, are yet another threat to it.

Martyn Hammersley is emeritus professor of educational and social research at the Open University.