Social constructions of the natural world

Compared with those working in aligned disciplines (eg psychology and economics), sociologists and anthropologists tend to be particularly sensitive to the fact that several categories, which appear to be fixed, are in fact socially constructed and variable. Several early sociologists saw it as one of their main tasks to demonstrate the extent to which the social is all-pervasive and makes for multiple realities.

For example, Durkheim and some of his followers endeavoured to show that even the categories of time, space and number are socially induced and that they vary from one culture to another. The way in which Durkheim tried to achieve this project has now been heavily criticised, but the project itself is still very much alive. The influence of Saussure's structuralism and Wittgenstein are of paramount importance here. Whatever Saussure and Wittgenstein might have written or might have wished to convey, some sociologists read them as providing the philosophical base for holding that there is no intrinsic meaning to a term, artefact or item. For structuralism, the meaning of a term or item is to be derived from its difference from other terms or items in operation. As for Wittgenstein, meaning arises out of usage within a particular cultural context. Both paved the way, so sociologists thought, for a new version of the Durkheimian research project. That programme set out to show the social and unstable nature of that which might appear invariable: time, space, nature, reason, and so on.

Phil Macnaghten and John Urry's Contested Natures does not mention these philosophical discussions, but it makes perfect sense to conceive of the book as part of the trend mentioned above, in that the authors set out to show that even nature is not "natural". The title of the book alludes to its central idea: there are a multitude of notions about nature, and these notions emerge out of social practices. By advocating this position, Macnaghten and Urry argue against various other views. First, they discard that which they call "environmental realism". According to environmental realists, to analyse nature is to identify its observable and measurable effects. These effects are regarded as independent of social practices. It is believed that, when subject to scientific investigation, these outcomes can be rectified. Second, Macnaghten and Urry argue against "environmental idealism". For environmental idealists, to analyse nature is to identify its universal values. Actual practices are evaluated on the basis of whether they are in tune with the invariable values. Third, they reject "environmental instrumentalism". Instrumentalists employ economic models to explain and predict under which circumstances people might be prepared to do something beneficial for the environment.

The strengths of this book lie in its breadth and the fact that it undertakes to link prima facie unrelated phenomena. It deals with a wide variety of topics, ranging from the history of English conservationism, the cultural aspects of globalisation, tourism and the philosophy of time to the recent BSE crisis. They all serve to elucidate the central notion that there is no such thing as a single nature.

Given the enormous scope, it is not surprising that the book every so often comes across as a trifle rushed and unfinished. More particularly, in spite of the one, central idea underlying the book, it still occasionally suffers from a lack of direction. The links between the different chapters remain tenuous, and the main thread of the argument tends to get somehow lost in the enormous mass of information.

Furthermore, several of the discussions are very much indebted to the work of others. For example, the sections on globalisation and risk draw heavily upon work by Ulrich Beck, Scott Lash and Anthony Giddens, and in this context little effort is made to go beyond the academic orthodoxies of the day.

Finally, the referencing is at times dreadfully imprecise. The authors suffer from the widespread referencing disease: they tend to end every paragraph by citing at least half a dozen people who might have written something vaguely related to the subject covered (eg Jones 1995, Johnson 1996, Thompson 1997, Jones and Thompson 1998). For instance, Macnaghten and Urry assert that several historians of ideas have shown, a la Edward Said, that the people of the colonies became objects of the colonising gaze. This statement is followed by five references, but at least one of the authorities cited, Richard Grove, does not toe the Foucauldian party line at all, and makes a totally different point: in Green Imperialism (published in 1995, and not 1990 as Macnaghten and Urry's bibliography mentions), he shows convincingly how European scientists were highly sensitive to and incorporated indigenous knowledge and attitudes.

Still, the sheer breadth of the project makes up for its weaknesses. This book is a valuable contribution to the neglected, though rapidly growing field of environmental sociology.

Patrick Baert is a fellow of New Hall, Cambridge.